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BACK	TO	THE	FUTURE:	REDISCOVERING	THE	LOST	ARTS	OF	THE	VICTORIAN	
MANDARIN	
	
	
	
	
Under	the	conventions	of	the	Westminster	system,	civil	service	mandarins	of	the	
twentieth	century	were	expected	to	be	discrete,	impartial	and	anonymous	as	
they	unobtrusively	carried	on	the	business	of	government.		Times	have	changed.		
The	pressures	of	modern	governance	and	a	24/7	media	cycle	are	pulling	
contemporary	public	service	leaders	further	into	the	public	limelight,	leading	to	
concerns	that	they	may	become	politicised.		This	paper	draws	on	an	older	civil	
service	leadership	tradition	from	the	Victorian	era,	as	embodied	in	the	person	of	
Charles	Trevelyan,	to	argue	that	robust	public	engagement	by	mandarins	need	
not	lead	to	their	politicisation.				
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Trevelyan;	Westminster	
	
	
	
For	much	of	the	twentieth	century,	senior	civil	servants	were	neither	seen	nor	heard.		
Quietly,	tactfully	and	anonymously	they	wielded	immense	policy	and	administrative	
power	in	Whitehall	whilst	the	public	gaze	remained	on	the	politicians	at	Westminster	
(see	Hennessy,	1989).		Anonymity	was	coupled	with	impartiality	as	one	of	the	core	
conventions	for	how	public	servants	should	conduct	themselves.		In	the	twenty-first	
century	a	renewed	emphasis	on	transparency,	accountability	and	policy	implementation	
has	seen	modern	mandarins	emerge	from	anonymity	to	adopt	a	much	more	public	face.		
Speeches,	media	interviews,	social	media	posts	and	select	committee	appearances	are	
an	integral	part	of	the	job	description	of	contemporary	civil	service	leaders	(see	Rhodes,	
2011).				Whilst	this	change	reflects	the	increasing	complexity	of	modern	governance	
and	the	influence	of	a	24/7	media	cycle,	it	also	in	fact	draws	on	a	much	older	civil	
service	leadership	tradition.			
	
The	Northcote-Trevelyan	Report	of	1854	set	out	the	foundations	of	a	merit-
based	employment	system,	but	it	did	not	advocate	for	an	‘apolitical’	civil	service	that	
should	operate	in	the	shadows.		Sir	Stafford	Northcote,	Sir	Charles	Trevelyan	and	their	
contemporaries	were	in	many	ways	policy	entrepreneurs	(Kingdon,	1984),	men	with	
strong	political	opinions	who	frequently	sought	to	shape	the	administrative	and	policy	
worlds	in	very	public	ways.		This	paper	re-examines	the	public	leadership	of	Victorian	
mandarins	through	the	lens	of	contemporary	practice	to	analyse	whether	a	‘public’	role	
for	mandarins	inevitably	leads	to	perceptions	of	politicisation	that	undermine	the	
impartiality	that	is	central	to	the	workings	of	a	Westminster	system	bureacracy.	
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Mid-Victorian	mandarins	like	Trevelyan	were	given	a	degree	of	license	by	their	
political	masters	to	be	vigorously	involved	in	the	policy	process,	including	in	public	ways.		
As	discussed	below	in	the	Trevelyan	case	study,	this	publicly-engaged	style	of	
administrative	leadership	could	lead	to	intense	criticism,	but	Trevelyan’s	fierce	
intellectual	independence	and	determined	non-partisanship	insulated	him	against	
perceptions	of	politicisation,	even	when	he	was	deeply	engaged	in	very	‘political’	
matters.		Critics	frequently	attacked	his	ideas	and	his	approach	rather	than	making	
allegations	that	he	had	become	inappropriately	‘politicised’.		This	stands	in	contrast	to	
contemporary	mandarins	in	the	twenty-first	century	who	no	longer	enjoy	the	same	
degree	of	license	to	engage	at	the	more	controversial	edges	of	public	policy.		Hence,	
when	they	speak	in	public,	critics	are	quick	to	allege	that	they	are	doing	so	for	‘political’	
reasons	or	that	they	have	‘politicised’	themselves	by	being	overly	supportive	of	the	
government	of	the	day.	
	
Whilst	the	central	argument	of	the	paper	draws	a	comparison	between	the	
Victorian	era	and	today,	that	analysis	is	framed	against	the	backdrop	of	the	more	
anonymous	leadership	styles	of	the	mandarins	of	the	twentieth	century.		Of	course,	this	
intervening	period	was	also	one	of	great	complexity	and	nuance	in	the	roles	that	senior	
civil	servants	were	asked	to	play.		In	painting	the	period	with	broad	strokes	as	an	era	of	
quiet	but	powerful	mandarins,	I	am	applying	a	generalisation	that	covers	a	myriad	of	
differences	in	individual	practice.		Some	figures	during	that	time	frequently	also	gave	
public	speeches,	or	found	themselves	in	the	headlines	through	their	official	behaviour.		
For	example,	Sir	William	Armstrong,	as	Head	of	the	Home	Civil	Service,	became	a	key	
public	figure	during	the	period	of	the	Heath	Government	in	particular.		Edward	Bridges	
published	a	widely	read	lecture	on	the	nature	of	the	civil	service	in	his	1950	Portrait	of	a	
Profession.		Leaders	such	as	Bridges	(see	Chapman,	1988),	Warren	Fisher,	Percival	
Waterfield	(see	Chapman,	1984),	Evelyn	Sharp,	Otto	Clarke,	Norman	Brook,	and	Burke	
Trend	were	towering	figures	who	wielded	great	power	at	the	edges	of	the	public	
consciousness,	and	did	at	times	break	through	the	surface	following	key	decisions	or	
appearances	in	front	of	parliamentary	committees.		An	excellent	composite	biographical	
study	of	many	of	these	figures	by	Theakston	(1999)	confirms	that	the	natural	discretion	
of	mandarins	often	belied	what	was	in	reality	a	wide	engagement	with	the	world	
beyond	Whitehall.		So	in	framing	this	era	as	a	time	in	which	mandarins	operated	more	in	
the	shadows,	it	is	an	argument	of	degrees	rather	than	absolutes	in	differentiating	it	from	
the	contemporary	period.	
	
But	those	differences	in	degree	are	vital	to	explaining	shifting	patterns	in	civil	
service	leadership.		Figures	like	Norman	Brook	and	Burke	Trend	were	certainly	not	
wilting	violets	who	chose	to	be	largely	anonymous	out	of	a	lack	of	self-confidence.		They	
were	every	bit	as	frank	and	fearless	in	their	advice	as	Charles	Trevelyan	was	in	his,	but	
they	largely	offered	their	analysis	behind	the	privacy	of	closed	doors.		They	flourished	at	
a	time	of	a	‘consensual	conservative	approach	to	bureaucracy’	(Greenaway,	1992),	in	
which	an	elite	mandarinate	was	seen	as	being	of	a	piece	with	the	political	class	it	served.		
Coinciding	with	a	long	period	of	majority	governments	from	1924-1974,	there	was	a	
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general	stability	around	the	roles	expected	of	senior	civil	servants.		By	maintaining	a	low	
public	profile,	mandarins	insulated	themselves	from	the	public	assessments	of	those	
who	might	have	wished	to	critique	their	words	as	evidence	of	some	kind	of	
politicisation.		Civil	service	leaders	are	meant	to	have	strong	views,	and	the	confidence	
to	take	them	up	with	their	minister.		The	successful	working	of	the	‘Whitehall	model’	
relies	upon	it.		But	attempting	to	do	so	whilst	operating	in	a	far	more	public	limelight	
creates	room	for	perceptions	of	politicisation	to	emerge	as	commentators	and	
opposition	MPs	assess	the	words	and	behaviours	of	mandarins	through	the	lens	of	their	
own	partisan	agendas.	
	
This	potential	link	between	anonymity	and	impartiality	creates	a	difficult	
balancing	act	for	current	senior	civil	servants	who	are	exhorted	to	be	more	open	and	
engaged	with	the	community,	only	to	be	excoriated	for	alleged	‘politicisation’	if	their	
remarks	are	seen	as	too	pertinent.		It	was	a	problem	recognised	but	not	resolved	in	the	
1960s	by	the	Fulton	report,	which	argued	that	the	risks	in	reducing	anonymity	were	
outweighed	by	the	benefits:	
	
The	argument	of	the	preceding	paragraphs	has	important	implications	for	the	
traditional	anonymity	of	civil	servants.		It	is	already	being	eroded	by	Parliament	
and	to	a	more	limited	extent	by	the	pressures	of	the	press,	radio	and	television;	
the	process	will	continue	and	we	see	no	reason	to	seek	to	reverse	it…We	do	not	
under-estimate	the	risks	involved	in	such	a	change.		It	is	often	difficult	to	explain	
without	also	appearing	to	argue;	however	impartially	one	presents	the	facts,	
there	will	always	be	those	who	think	that	the	presentation	is	biased…We	believe	
that	this	will	have	to	be	faced	and	that	Ministers	and	M.P.s	should	take	a	
tolerant	view	of	the	civil	servant	who	inadvertently	steps	out	of	line.	(Fulton,	
1968,	paras	283-4)	
	
As	discussed	in	section	3	below,	contemporary	evidence	suggests	that	Ministers	and	
MPs	are	not	necessarily	naturally	predisposed	to	taking	a	‘tolerant	view	of	the	civil	
servant	who	inadvertently	steps	out	of	line’	in	every	case.	
	
In	the	sections	that	follow,	I	begin	by	examining	the	theory	and	practice	of	
contemporary	public	service	leadership,	and	in	particular	the	ways	in	which	modern	
mandarins	contribute	to	public	debates	in	the	twenty-first	century	governance	
environment.		Section	two	then	focuses	on	the	career	and	leadership	attributes	of	
Charles	Trevelyan	as	a	case	study	of	civil	service	leadership	in	the	mid-Victorian	period.		
The	final	section	then	draws	together	contemporary	debates	with	the	challenges	of	the	
mid-Victorian	era	to	argue	that	contemporary	public	service	leaders	are	in	fact	drawing	
significantly	on	mid-Victorian	styles	of	public	leadership	to	meet	the	complex	demands	
of	modern	governance.		The	significance	of	this	reversion	to	an	older	style	of	‘public’	
leadership	is	that	it	demonstrates	that	more	publicly	entrepreneurial	leadership	styles	
can	be	accommodated	within	the	Westminster	system	of	government	without	
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undermining	core	components	such	as	ministerial	responsibility	and	public	service	
impartiality.	
	
1. Contemporary	Public	Service	Leadership	
	
As	the	full	impact	of	the	changes	associated	with	the	New	Public	Management	
have	washed	through	the	work	of	public	servants	over	the	past	three	decades,	scholars	
and	practitioners	alike	have	turned	to	leadership	studies	in	order	to	search	for	the	kind	
of	attributes	that	are	necessary	for	success	in	the	complex	modern	governance	
environment.		In	fact,	there	has	been	something	of	a	‘leadership	turn’	in	public	
administration	in	the	last	decade	(see	Van	Wart,	2013;	Vandenabeele,	2014;	Bao	et	al,	
2013;	Simmons,	2011;	Leslie	and	Canwell,	2010;	Tizard,	2012;	Ritz	et	al,	2014;	Althaus	
and	Wanna	2008;	Kavanagh	and	Richards	2003;	Chapman	and	O’Toole,	2010;	Rhodes,	
Wanna	and	Weller,	2008).		The	literature	is	rife	with	debate	over	what	the	best	form	of	
leadership	is	for	the	public	sector.		From	Moore’s	conception	of	pursuing	‘public	value’	
(1995)	to	Kane	and	Patapan’s	call	to	focus	on	the	value	of	‘prudence’	(2006;	see	also	‘t	
Hart,	2014),	leadership	studies	have	re-energised	debates	over	what	unique	attributes	
public	leaders	actually	require.						
	
	 Whichever	leadership	approach	modern	mandarins	adopt,	it	will	be	a	form	of	
leadership	that	is	inherently	more	‘public’	in	its	focus	than	was	the	case	for	much	of	the	
twentieth	century.		Leadership	through	public	outreach	is	now	an	entrenched	part	of	
the	job	for	those	at	the	top.		To	quote	Peter	Shergold,	former	Secretary	of	the	Australian	
Department	of	Prime	Minister	and	Cabinet:	‘I	spoke	to	hundreds	of	forums,	public	and	
private,	during	my	five	years	as	‘national	head’	of	the	APS’	(2014,	p.	92).		When	reaching	
out	to	multiple	stakeholders	in	relevant	policy	networks,	mandarins	deliver	public	
speeches	that	canvas	future	policy	challenges	and	how	governments	could	meet	them	
(Grube,	2012).		Similarly,	when	leaders	appear	before	parliamentary	committees	in	the	
UK,	their	evidence	is	now	broadcast	on	television.		It	is	by	definition	a	‘public’	act	of	
leadership.			
	 	
The	public	nature	of	contemporary	public	service	leadership	becomes	most	
apparent	when	it	involves	politically	contentious	policy	questions.		It	is	here	that	
accusations	of	‘politicisation’	are	most	likely	to	emerge,	as	public	service	leaders	are	
seen	to	have	compromised	their	impartiality	in	some	way.		The	line	between	
appropriate	‘responsiveness’	by	public	servants	and	inappropriate	‘politicisation’	is	a	
deeply	contested	one	(see	Mulgan,	2008).		When	it	comes	to	the	public	behaviour	of	
civil	servants,	what	can	be	termed	‘functional	politicization’	(Hustedt	and	Salomonsen,	
2014)	can	be	measured	by	the	degree	to	which	loyalty	to	the	government	of	the	day	
spills	over	into	a	more	enthusiastic	advocacy	for	its	inherently	partisan	policy	positions.		
Where	the	former	stops	and	the	latter	starts	is	inevitably	a	question	of	perception.		For	
example,	in	the	UK	in	early	2014	Treasury	Secretary	Sir	Nicholas	Macpherson	was	
accused	of	partisanship	for	agreeing	to	publicly	release	advice	that	was	critical	of	
Scotland	being	allowed	to	retain	the	British	pound	if	it	voted	for	independence	
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(Macpherson,	2014;	Scotsman,	2014).		In	Australia	in	mid-2014	Treasury	Secretary	
Martin	Parkinson	was	perceived	as	having	criticised	the	Labor	Opposition	with	his	
remarks	in	a	speech	critiquing	those	who	relied	on	‘vague	notions	of	fairness’	in	
criticising	the	government’s	budget	(Parkinson,	2014;	Bourke,	2014).			
	
Such	incidents	have	fed	the	concerns	of	scholarly	critics	(e.g.	Aucoin,	2012;	
Savoie,	2008)	who	argue	that	Westminster	system	public	services	have	become	
increasingly	politicised	in	partisan	ways,	and	that	this	is	reflected	in	the	roles	that	senior	
public	servants	are	prepared	to	play	in	public		One	of	the	strongest	critiques	is	from	the	
late	Peter	Aucoin,	who	has	suggested	that	a	form	of	‘promiscuous	partisanship’	is	
emerging.	
	
The	anonymity	of	public	servants,	as	invisible	to	parliament	or	the	public,	
disappeared	some	time	ago.	In	the	environment	of	NPG,	moreover,	
ministers,	sometimes	explicitly,	usually	implicitly,	expect	those	public	
servants	who	are	seen	and	heard	in	countless	public	forums	to	support	
government	policy,	that	is,	to	go	beyond	mere	description	and	
explanation…The	expectation	is	not	that	they	engage	in	the	partisan	
political	process,	for	example,	at	elections	or	political	rallies.	Rather,	it	is	
that	they	be	promiscuously	or	serially	partisan,	that	is,	to	be	the	agents	of	
the	government	of	the	day	in	relation	to	stakeholders,	organized	
interests,	citizens,	media,	and	parliamentarians	as	they	engage	in	
consultations,	service	delivery,	media	communications,	reporting	to	
parliament,	and	appearing	before	parliamentary	committees.	(Aucoin,	
2012,	189)	
	
In	other	words,	according	to	Aucoin,	the	politicisation	of	public	servants	is	reflected	in	
their	willingness	to	uncritically	toe	a	government	line	in	a	wide	range	of	public	forums.		
The	counter	argument	of	course	is	that	it	has	always	been	the	role	of	civil	servants	to	
serve	the	executive	government	of	the	day.		The	difference,	arguably,	is	that	translating	
that	type	of	service	from	a	private	to	a	public	forum	results	in	increased	perceptions	of	
politicisation,	even	if	in	reality	civil	servants	are	only	loyally	supporting	the	government	
of	the	day	as	they	have	always	done.		Public	perceptions,	once	established,	are	
inherently	difficult	for	the	individual	actor	to	control.		Shergold,	reflecting	on	his	own	
practice,	notes	that	publicly	explaining	policy	decisions:		‘could,	of	course,	easily	be	
perceived	to	be	spruiking	their	virtue’	(Shergold,	2014,	p.	86).	
	
The	claims	of	critics	remain	heavily	contested,	but	even	if	they	are	correct,	what	
is	the	way	forward?		If	modern	public	servants	have	to	participate	as	public	figures	in	an	
era	of	transparency	and	accountability,	is	there	a	way	in	which	they	can	do	so	without	
undermining	Westminster	conventions	of	non-partisanship	and	finding	themselves	
branded	as	having	become	politicised?		History	suggests	that	it	is	not	impossible.		In	the	
next	section	I	undertake	a	detailed	case	study	of	the	career	of	Charles	Trevelyan	to	draw	
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out	the	synergies	between	the	challenges	confronting	modern	public	service	leaders	
and	those	faced	by	their	mid-Victorian	counterparts.			
	
	
2. Charles	Trevelyan	–	Case	Study	of	a	‘Public’	Figure	
	
…it	has	at	last	begun	to	be	understood	that	the	proper	business	of	a	
Government,	is	to	enable	private	individuals	of	every	rank	and	profession	
in	life,	to	carry	on	their	several	occupations	with	freedom	and	safety,	and	
not	itself	to	undertake	the	business	of	the	landowner,	merchant,	money-
lender,	or	any	other	function	of	social	life	(Trevelyan,	1848,	p.	190).		
	
Sir	Charles	Trevelyan	was	a	man	with	strong	opinions	on	government	and	what	it	should	
be	doing.		He	wrote	these	words	in	1848,	at	the	height	of	his	power	as	the	permanent	
secretary	to	the	Treasury	in	the	United	Kingdom	(then	known	as	‘Assistant	Secretary’).		
The	words	formed	part	of	a	book	he	published	that	year	under	the	title	The	Irish	Crisis	–	
detailing	the	events	of	the	great	famine	that	had	swept	through	Ireland	over	the	
preceding	three	years.		Trevelyan	knew	a	great	deal	about	the	famine,	because	it	was	
his	duty	as	Assistant	Secretary	at	the	Treasury	to	implement	and	oversee	all	famine	
relief	measures	throughout	the	period.		So	taken	was	he	by	his	efforts	that	he	took	the	
time	during	the	latter	part	of	the	crisis	to	write	a	two	hundred	page	book	about	it	–	
lauding	the	relief	efforts	and	the	good	that	would	come	out	of	the	famine	for	Ireland	as	
a	whole.			
	
A	historiographical	battle	continues	to	rage	over	whether	Charles	Trevelyan	was	
a	cold-hearted	bureaucrat	who	starved	Ireland	in	its	hour	of	need,	or	rather	a	
benevolent	civil	servant	who	did	everything	he	humanly	could	to	avert	the	catastrophe	
(see	Haines,	2004;	Woodham-Smith,	1962;	Trevelyan,	2012).		That	debate	has	raged	for	
well	over	five	decades,	and	shows	little	sign	of	slowing	down,	and	I	do	not	intend	to	add	
to	it	here.		Rather,	this	paper	seeks	to	examine	the	wider	career	of	Trevelyan	as	head	of	
the	Treasury	to	analyse	what	his	tenure	demonstrates	about	the	style	and	role	of	civil	
service	leadership	in	the	mid-Victorian	era.		What	Trevelyan’s	book	on	the	Irish	famine	
does	show,	is	that	he	willingly	embraced	a	public	form	of	leadership	–	one	prepared	to	
engage	openly	in	intense	policy	debates,	rather	than	quietly	working	away	in	the	
shadow	of	his	minister.	
	
Scholars	of	the	Civil	Service	will	most	readily	of	course	associate	Trevelyan’s	
name	with	the	1854	report	that	set	the	foundation	stone	for	much	of	what	is	now	
considered	central	to	a	Westminster	system	civil	service.			Authored	in	partnership	with	
Sir	Stafford	Northcote	–	a	future	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	–	the	Northcote-Trevelyan	
report	ushered	in	selection	on	merit	through	examination,	and	advocated	for	a	clearer	
delineation	of	labour	between	policy	roles	and	more	mechanical	work.		These	were	very	
significant	proposals	for	change,	and	they	took	many	years	to	actually	be	implemented.		
Even	then,	as	Greenaway	(2004,	p.	9)	points	out,	other	Westminster	fundamentals	like	
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public	service	impartiality	weren’t	embedded	as	part	of	Westminster	convention	until	
many	years	later.	
	
Trevelyan	is	a	man	who	has	attracted	considerable	attention,	both	from	his	
contemporaries	and	from	writers	since.		To	quote	historian	Henry	Roseveare:	‘Much	has	
been	written	about	Sir	Charles	Trevelyan	–	perhaps	too	much	for	a	man	with	such	highly	
developed	gifts	of	self-advertisement’	(Roseveare,	1969,	p.	165).		Trevelyan’s	career	
trajectory	suggests	that	he	was	never	going	to	be	a	man	satisfied	with	hiding	his	
intellectual	light	under	the	bushel	of	administrative	niceties.		Something	of	a	prodigy,	he	
made	his	name	in	Indian	public	administration	as	an	East	India	Company	civil	servant	in	
Delhi	and	then	Calcutta	from	1826	until	1838,	when	he	returned	to	England.		When	
appointed	as	Assistant	Treasury	Secretary	in	1840,	he	was	only	in	his	early	30s	and	then	
distinguished	himself	by	holding	that	role	for	the	best	part	of	the	next	twenty	years.	
	
Trevelyan	was	in	many	ways	a	man	of	his	times.		He	was	a	restless	intellectual,	
seized	with	the	moral	need	to	implement	liberal	ideas	whilst	maintaining	an	iron	hand	
on	the	public	finances	in	search	of	ever-greater	efficiencies.		He	had	been	taught	at	the	
East	India	Company’s	civil	service	college	‘Haileybury’	by	Thomas	Malthus	(see	Gowan,	
1987,	pp.	14-16)	and	something	of	Malthus’s	darwinian	attitudes	may	have	rubbed	off	
on	the	young	Trevelyan,	including	in	the	latter’s	determination	that	the	Civil	Service	
should	not	be	a	place	of	ease	(see	Hart,	1960,	p.	94).		There	was	simply	too	much	to	do	
in	Trevelyan’s	view	to	allow	any	civil	servant	to	merely	placidly	administer	the	
departments	of	state.		To	once	more	borrow	from	Roseveare’s	delightful	turns	of	
phrase,	Trevelyan	was	intent	on	‘[b]ounding	through	thickets	of	departmental	
incompetence	like	some	bureaucratic	hound	of	the	Baskervilles…’	(Roseveare,	1969,	p.	
165).		
	
Most	importantly	for	the	arguments	of	this	paper,	Trevelyan	was	perceived	to	be	
a	civil	servant	who	was	either	unwilling	or	unable	to	avoid	building	a	public	persona	of	
his	own.		He	was	as	controversial	a	figure	as	any	of	his	ministerial	masters	in	his	tenure	
at	the	Treasury.		Such	was	his	public	infamy,	that	one	of	the	period’s	most	popular	
novelists	created	a	caricature	of	him.		Anthony	Trollope’s	novel	The	Three	Clerks	created	
the	character	of	‘Sir	Gregory	Hardlines’,	who	the	novelist	admitted	was	modelled	on	
Trevelyan.		There	must	be	few	if	any	modern	public	service	leaders	who	have	achieved	
such	fictional	notoriety.		
	
Trevelyan’s	name	was	always	in	the	public	eye,	and	not	least	due	to	the	multiple	
debates	in	parliament	centred	in	some	part	on	Trevelyan’s	personality	as	an	energetic	
evangelical	for	almost	all	kinds	of	government	reform.		Hansard	from	the	period	
abounds	with	mentions	of	Trevelyan’s	name	as	his	defenders	and	detractors	in	the	
Parliament	clashed	repeatedly.		From	debates	over	Trevelyan’s	handling	of	the	Irish	
famine	crisis,	to	his	handling	of	military	supplies	during	the	Crimean	War,	the	name	of	
the	Assistant	Treasury	to	the	Secretary	appears	ubiquitously.		For	example,	in	August	
1848,	there	was	a	debate	over	whether	Trevelyan	should	be	paid	a	bonus	for	his	
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services	during	the	famine,	a	payment	that	Disraeli	asserted	‘was	surely	conceived	in	
rather	bad	taste’	(Hansard,	14	Aug	1848,	Series	3,	Vol.	101	c.	139).		The	Prime	Minister,	
Lord	John	Russell,	sprang	to	Trevelyan’s	defence,	asserting	the	primacy	of	ministerial	
responsibility	for	the	work	of	civil	servants.		In	the	process,	he	confirmed	that	
Trevelyan’s	reputation	as	a	work-a-holic	was	well-deserved.	
	
…whatever	errors	might	have	been	committed,	the	Government	were	to	
blame	for	them.		Sir	C.	Trevelyan	stated	in	his	evidence	that	he	worked	
three	hours	before	breakfast;	that	he	then	went	to	the	Treasury,	where	
he	worked	all	day;	and	that	the	pressure	upon	him	was	such,	that	he	
wondered	that	he	had	been	able	to	get	through	it	alive.		If	the	
Government	had	done	wrong	in	including	the	vote	in	the	civil	
contingencies,	he	hoped	that	their	error	would	not	be	visited	upon	one	of	
the	most	intelligent	and	laborious	officers	that	he	had	ever	known.	
(Hansard,	14	Aug	1848,	Series	3,	Vol.	101,	cc.	140-141)				
		
	 Not	all	MPs	were	as	generous	in	their	views	of	Trevelyan.		In	1853,	reflecting	on	
Trevelyan’s	recent	evidence	to	a	parliamentary	committee,	the	Irish	MP	George	Henry	
Moore	did	not	hold	back	in	his	opinions,	and	they	are	worth	quoting	at	length	to	
capture	the	severity	of	the	attack.	
	
From	one	end	of	his	evidence	to	the	other,	this	self-satisfied	functionary	
seems	utterly	unable	to	conceive	the	possibility	of	his	having	ever	made	a	
mistake,	even	the	most	trifling.	To	be	sure	nothing	that	he	undertook	
succeeded—nothing	that	he	anticipated	came	to	pass—disaster	followed	
every	scheme	he	originated-and	he	aggravated	every	disaster	by	the	
remedies	he	applied.	The	conclusion	to	which	he	is	led	by	these	
undeniable	facts	is,	that	every	one	was	to	blame	except	himself;	and	that	
Irish	landlords,	Irish	ratepayers,	Irish	priests,	Irish	paupers,	and	a	special	
divine	providence	for	Ireland,	were	all	in	league	to	baffle	the	unerring	
sagacity	of	Sir	C.	Trevelyan…	I	see	a	dogmatist	that	no	experience	can	
instruct—a	theorist	that	no	evidence	can	enlighten—a	practical	
blunderer,	whose	self-complacency	failure	only	hardens	and	confirms,	
permitted	to	lean,	if	not	to	dominate,	over	the	affairs	of	a	country	in	
which	he	is	regarded	by	every	class,	sect,	and	party,	with	unanimous	
jealousy	and	distrust.	(Hansard	7	April	1853,	Series	3,	Vol.	125,	cc.	736-
737)	
	
Trevelyan	was	defended	by	his	minister	-	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	
William	Gladstone	–	who	labelled	Moore’s	comments	a	‘gross	personal	attack’	on	a	civil	
servant	unable	to	respond	in	kind	(Hansard	7	April	1853,	Series	3,	Vol.	125,	c.	755).		
Moore’s	response	to	Gladstone	captures	much	about	Trevelyan’s	status	as	a	willing	
public	figure	in	his	own	right.	
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The	right	hon.	Gentleman	said	that	he	had	made	a	personal	charge	
against	Sir	Charles	Trevelyan.	What	did	he	mean	by	a	personal	charge?	
Did	he	(Mr.	Moore)	make	a	charge	against	his	private	character?	He	
spoke	of	him	as	a	public	character,	and	limited	his	remarks	entirely	to	his	
public	conduct,	and	to	his	published	evidence;	and	the	right	hon.	
Gentleman	arrogated	a	great	deal	too	much	for	public	servants	if	he	
thought	that	Members	of	Parliament	should	be	prevented	from	
arraigning	their	conduct	when	they	exceeded	their	public	duty.	The	right	
hon.	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	said	that	Sir	Charles	Trevelyan	was	not	
in	that	House	to	defend	himself;	but	he	was	everywhere	else—whether	
as	an	official	or	a	pamphleteer,	whether	in	his	public	or	his	secret	
correspondence,	he	seemed	to	have	devoted	his	leisure	hours	to	the	
noble	art	of	self-defence,	which	meant	in	his	case,	as	in	that	of	others,	
the	art	of	assailing	others.	(Hansard	7	April	1853,	Series	3,	Vol.	125,	c.	
789)	
	
Trevelyan	demonstrated	a	combative	style	of	public	civil	service	leadership.		His	
understanding	of	the	need	to	be	non-partisan	did	not	mean	he	would	allow	himself	to	
be	cowed	by	parliamentarians	or	any	other	critics.		It	was	a	type	of	civil	service	
leadership	that	was	confident	(critics	would	say	arrogant)	and	more	than	able	to	engage	
fully	in	public	policy	arm-wrestles	with	all-comers.		And	he	used	whatever	means,	public	
or	private,	were	available	to	him.		For	example,	in	relation	to	the	supply	of	food	
provisions	for	the	Crimean	War,	the	War	Secretary	Sidney	Herbert	rose	in	parliament	
because	he	had	been	asked	‘to	read	the	following	letter	from	Sir	Charles	Trevelyan,	who	
wished	to	place	before	the	public	the	truth	of	the	matter	so	far	as	he	was	concerned’	
(Hansard	29	January	1855,	Series	3,	Vol.	136,	c.	1120).	
	
Ministers	were	not	the	only	people	to	be	seconded	as	Trevelyan’s	mouthpieces	
when	occasion	demanded.		He	was	equally	adept	at	working	closely	with	members	of	
the	fourth	estate	to	influence	public	debate	in	favour	of	his	objectives.		This	included	his	
attempts	to	gain	support	for	his	vision	of	civil	service	reform	as	encapsulated	in	the	
Northcote-Trevelyan	report.		To	quote	historians	Hughes	and	O’Brien:	‘Not	the	least	
interesting	aspect	of	the	ensuing	controversy	is	the	way	in	which	Trevelyan	primed	the	
press,	notably	The	Times,	and	systematically	elicited	influential	opinion,	‘the	best	
authorities’	as	he	called	them,	in	support	of	his	plan...’	(Trevelyan,	Hughes	and	O’Brien,	
PART	I,	1949,	p.	64).		This	perceived	influence	extended	to	stopping	debates	when	
necessary,	as	when	Gladstone	became	concerned	about	the	level	of	Trevelyan’s	
engagement	with	the	press.		In	a	January	1854	letter	to	Gladstone,	Trevelyan	wrote:	‘I	
will	immediately	take	the	most	effectual	steps	in	my	power	to	prevent	any	further	
discussion	of	the	plan	in	the	Newspapers	and	I	shall	be	disappointed	if	I	cannot	do	it	
effectually’	(cited	in	Trevelyan,	Hughes	and	O’Brien,	PART	I,	1949,	p.	71).	
	 	
	 Other	senior	civil	servants	at	the	Treasury	felt	that	the	Northcote-Trevelyan	
report	had	been	far	too	dismissive	about	the	talents	of	current	civil	servants.		Their	
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resentment	extended	to	questioning	the	ways	that	Trevelyan	sought	to	publicly	
prosecute	his	case	through	the	media.		George	Arbuthnot,	Auditor	of	the	Civil	List,	
wrote	to	Gladstone	on	several	occasions	denouncing	Trevelyan’s	contacts	with	the	press	
(Trevelyan,	Hughes	and	O’Brien,	PART	II,	1949,	pp.	207-8,	221-224).		He	objected	equally	
strongly	to	the	circulation	of	a	pamphlet	presumed	to	be	by	Trevelyan,	which	had	been	
printed	by	the	Foreign	Office	printer,	and	contained	what	Arbuthnot	considered	to	be	
‘odious	and	reprehensible’	descriptions	of	the	existing	civil	service	(Trevelyan,	Hughes	
and	O’Brien,	PART	II,	1949,	p.	223)	
	
Trevelyan	was	relentless		-	both	in	his	appetite	for	reform	and	innovation	and	in	
his	determination	in	pursuing	it.		In	the	early	1850’s,	he	bombarded	Gladstone	with	
letters	outlining	his	personal	views	on	how	and	when	the	government	should	proceed	
on	civil	service	reform.		Civil	Service	advice	can	seldom	have	been	as	frank	and	fearless	
as	it	was	when	it	flowed	from	the	pen	of	C.	Trevelyan.		The	rhetorical	flair	of	his	
Thoughts	on	Patronage	(see	Trevelyan,	Hughes	and	O’Brien,	PART	I,	1949,	pp.	69-70)	
focussed	more	on	vague	charges	of	corruption	and	failure	in	the	patronage	system	than	
on	a	systematic	presentation	of	evidence	on	the	topic.		Its	emotive	tone	makes	
breathtaking	reading	in	comparison	to	the	carefully	weighed	prose	of	the	modern	public	
service.	
	
Of	course,	in	addition	to	his	vast	private	correspondence	with	leading	figures,	
Trevelyan	was	perfectly	happy	to	publish	things	under	his	own	name	or	under	a	
pseudonym	if	he	thought	it	warranted.		His	1848	monograph	on	The	Irish	Crisis	was	not	
intended	to	remain	a	reflective	work	intended	only	for	the	eyes	of	his	colleagues.		As	
Hart	notes:	
He	sent	it	to	everyone	he	could	think	of	from	the	pope,	the	king	of	
Prussia,	and	Guizot,	to	minor	officials	in	the	commissariat;	and	he	was	
always	quite	certain	the	recipients	would	read	it	with	interest,	especially	
as	it	was	‘prepared	with	so	much	labour	and	attention	to	accuracy’,	and	
since	he	was,	in	his	view,	in	a	better	position	than	anyone	else	to	write	it.	
(Hart,	1960,	p.	102)	
	
He	also	maintained	a	prodigious	output	of	letters	to	the	press	throughout	his	
civil	service	career	and	into	retirement	–	and	they	often	drew	controversy.		For	example,	
in	the	early	1840’s	he	wrote	a	two-part	letter	to	the	Morning	Chronicle	under	the	
pseudonym	‘Philalethes’	about	the	state	of	Ireland	after	the	arrest	of	the	popular	leader	
Daniel	O’Connell.		Trevelyan	was	of	course	Assistant	Secretary	to	the	Treasury	at	the	
time,	and	had	given	a	private	briefing	to	the	Prime	Minister	and	Home	Secretary	on	the	
state	of	Ireland	–	a	briefing	his	political	masters	had	thought	would	remain	private.		
When	the	letters	appeared	in	the	Morning	Chronicle,	the	indignant	PM	–	Robert	Peel	–	
wrote	to	the	Home	Secretary,	Sir	James	Graham,	asking	how	Trevelyan	‘…could	think	it	
consistent	with	common	decency	to	reveal	to	the	Editor	of	the	Morning	Chronicle	and	to	
the	world	–	all	he	told	us...He	must	be	a	consummate	fool’	(cited	in	G.	Kitson	Clark,	
1959,	p.	31).	
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Whether	or	not	Trevelyan	was	a	fool	was	a	matter	of	contemporary	debate,	but	
he	certainly	displayed	remarkable	political	skills	–	and	what	might	today	be	called	
‘networking’	abilities	–	to	publicly	pursue	his	policy	ends.		He	used	the	press	at	a	time	
when	it	was	the	only	available	vehicle	for	reaching	a	mass	audience	in	order	to	influence	
public	debate.		In	addition	to	his	several	pseudonyms,	whilst	still	Assistant	Secretary	at	
the	Treasury	he	wrote	under	his	own	name	to	The	Times	about	diverse	topics	including	
emigration	policy	for	the	Scottish	Highlands	in	the	1850s,	in	1847	about	the	nature	of	
‘Distress	in	Ireland’,	in	1855	about	military	supplies	in	the	Crimean	War,	and	in	1858	on	
the	‘Western	Bank	of	Scotland’	and	a	second	letter	debating	the	need	for	teaching	
Sanscrit	to	Civil	Servants	posted	to	India.	
	
Trevelyan	was	an	unapologetic	political	player,	but	not	in	an	overtly	partisan	
manner.		He	in	fact	believed	fervently	in	non-partisanship.		Trevelyan’s	views	were	that	
a	mandarin	should	be	above	party	–	insisting	on	in	fact	not	voting	in	elections	(Hart,	
1960,	p.	109)	–	but	his	own	actions	attest	that	this	did	not	mean	that	civil	service	leaders	
should	remain	above	politics	broadly	construed.		All	policy	decisions	were	full	of	politics,	
and	Trevelyan	did	not	shy	away	from	placing	his	own	views	on	the	public	record,	and	
publicly	defending	the	actions	he	undertook	as	Treasury	Assistant	Secretary.		For	
example,	in	his	book	on	Ireland	he	was	willing	to	attack	by	name	the	proposal	of	a	
leading	conservative	critic,	Lord	George	Bentinck,	for	a	large	public	works	rail	scheme	
(Trevelyan,	1848,	p.	180).	
	
Trevelyan	instinctively	understood	that	public	policy	does	not	operate	in	some	
kind	of	‘apolitical’	parallel	universe.		He	didn’t	just	quietly	advise	on	public	policy,	he	
pursued	it	publicly	and	relentlessly	through	all	avenues	open	to	him.		In	doing	so,	he	was	
following	the	methods	of	pioneering	and	reforming	civil	servants	like	Edwin	Chadwick	
and	Kay	Shuttleworth	(see	G.	Kitson	Clark,	1959;	Gowan	1987).		As	Kitson	Clark	writes	of	
Chadwick’s	social	reforms,	‘…the	schemes	in	question	were	his	schemes	and	known	to	
be	so,	warmly	praised	or	bitterly	attacked	as	the	work	of	his	hands.		Neutrality	would	
have	been	meaningless	for	him,	anonymity	was	impossible’	(1959,	p.	32).		The	same	
could	easily	be	said	for	Trevelyan	and	many	others	of	his	contemporary	mandarins.		The	
collected	views	of	mandarins	on	the	changes	proposed	by	the	Northcote-Trevelyan	
Report,	published	in	1855	as	Papers	Relating	to	the	Re-Organization	of	the	Civil	Service,	
show	just	how	fiercely	engaged	senior	civil	servants	were	on	the	topic.		This	ranged	from	
those,	like	James	Stephen,	who	felt	that	the	‘obscurity’	of	civil	service	work	would	not	
attract	the	best	and	the	brightest	(p.	75),	through	to	Rowland	Hill	who	lauded	attempts	
‘to	purify	and	elevate	the	Public	Service’	(p.	243).		Trevelyan	and	his	contemporaries	
were	politically	aware	entrepreneurs	of	reform,	with	some	willing	to	take	part	as	active	
participants	in	public	debate,	whilst	still	jealously	guarding	their	non-partisan	status.		
Trevelyan’s	success	at	maintaining	that	balance	can	be	attested	to	by	the	fact	that	he	
remained	in	post	for	nearly	twenty	years,	serving	multiple	ministries	who	inevitably	
defended	his	performance.	
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3. Non-Partisan	Leadership	in	a	Political	Environment	
	
The	behaviour	and	leadership	approach	of	Victorian	civil	service	leaders	like	
Charles	Trevelyan	serves	as	a	reminder	that	the	Westminster	system	has	always	been	
fluid.		Conventions	and	traditions	have	evolved	over	time.		The	emergence	of	mandarins	
as	increasingly	public	figures	in	the	twenty-first	century	may	represent	a	break	with	
recent	tradition,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	the	Westminster	system	is	suddenly	
broken.		Evolution	involves	change,	but	it	is	always	change	built	on	what	was	there	
before.		So,	for	example,	those	modern	mandarins	who	speak	out	in	public	debates	have	
not	suddenly	abandoned	their	firm	commitment	to	Westminster	traditions	of	
impartiality.		Their	willing	emergence	from	anonymity	has	not	translated	into	a	willing	
embrace	of	partisanship.		But	the	public	nature	of	their	modern	role	means	that	
perceptions	of	partisanship	are	now	perhaps	harder	to	control	than	they	were	
previously.		
	
Modern	mandarins	have	to	walk	a	precarious	public	path	between	serving	the	
government	of	the	day	and	protecting	their	reputation	as	non-partisan	administrators.		
Through	their	speeches,	they	are	engaging	in	acts	of	public	persuasion	–	both	about	
what	they	and	their	departments	are	doing,	and	about	what	the	policy	challenges	are	
that	governments	will	have	to	address	in	the	short,	medium	and	longer	term.		They	have	
become	public	rhetoricians	who	once	only	whispered	to	ministers	behind	the	scenes	
and	must	now	join	them	out	on	the	front	stage.		And	they	have	to	do	all	of	that	without	
straying	too	far	into	the	territory	of	contemporary	political	contestation.	
	
The	Northcote-Trevelyan	Report	of	1854	set	the	path	for	the	emergence	of	a	
modern	civil	service.		But	the	report’s	authors	did	not	see	leadership	in	the	civil	service	
as	a	task	for	obedient	ciphers,	but	rather	for	independent	men	of	sufficient	character	to	
be	able	to	influence	their	ministerial	masters.		Trevelyan	in	fact	planned	for	the	fluid	
movement	of	civil	servants	in	and	out	of	politics,	seeing	the	Civil	Service	as	the	perfect	
training	ground	for	future	politicians.		In	a	letter	to	Delane,	the	editor	of	The	Times	
newspaper,	Trevelyan	framed	a	stint	in	the	civil	service	as	the	best	way	to	understand	
the	art	of	governing.	
	
If	the	Civil	Establishments	were	improved	as	we	propose,	men	would	be	
continually	leaving	them	to	go	into	Parliament.		The	Civil	Administration	
would	become	the	best	school	for	Parliament,	and	the	highly	educated	
sons	of	our	upper	&	middle	classes	would	pass	through	the	examinations	
into	the	Treasury	&	Foreign	&	Colonial	&	Home	Offices	of	the	Board	of	
Trade	or	the	Diplomatic	Service	and	so	on	into	Parliament	as	they	do	now	
in	a	limited	and	imperfect	manner	by	acting	as	Private	Secretaries.		The	
want	of	a	preliminary	training	of	this	sort	is	at	present	very	perceptible	in	
our	political	official	men.		The	virtue	of	the	new	regime	would,	therefore,	
come	back	through	Parliament	to	our	administrative	system;	&	while	the	
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two	parts	of	our	Government	would	be	alike	raised	to	a	higher	standard,	
they	would	also	be	reduced	to	harmony	with	each	other.	(as	cited	in	
Greenaway,	2004,	p.	10)			
	
Trevelyan	was	a	man	of	immense	energy,	infused	with	a	zealous	determination	
to	reform	British	public	administration.		The	written	correspondence	of	his	
contemporaries	shows	that	not	all	were	convinced	either	of	the	rightness	of	his	cause	or	
the	abrasiveness	of	his	language	in	pursuing	it.		Trevelyan	defended	himself	vigorously	
against	such	critiques,	and	certainly	didn’t	let	them	moderate	his	single-mindedness.		In	
a	period	of	fluid	transition,	Trevelyan	envisaged	himself	both	as	the	architect	and	the	
archetype	of	a	modern	administrative	meritocracy.		He	advocated	for	a	civil	service	built	
in	his	own	image.		He	foresaw	an	institution	full	of	drive	and	fervour,	where	men	of	
demonstrable	merit	could	make	their	mark	and	receive	their	reward.		It	helps	to	explain	
why	his	emphasis	was	on	questions	of	merit	and	systematisation	rather	than	anonymity	
and	being	‘apolitical’.		Trevelyan	undoubtedly	saw	himself	as	someone	who	was	
politically	engaged	but	impartial,	and	a	man	who	had	risen	to	great	heights	at	a	young	
age	based	on	his	great	merit	rather	than	through	unwarranted	patronage.		In	the	
Northcote-Trevelyan	report,	he	sought	to	entrench	this	view	of	his	experience	as	the	
basis	for	a	new	model	of	public	administration.	
	
Victorian	Britain	was	a	complicated	place.		It	was	an	age	of	new	complexity,	rapid	
technological	change,	and	social	transformation.		It	was	a	fluid	governance	environment	
where	much	was	decided	by	the	personal	energy	and	drive	of	civil	servants	willing	to	
seize	on	reforming	ideas	and	take	them	forward.		Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	the	period	
gave	rise	to	a	style	of	civil	service	leadership	capable	of	meeting	the	exigencies	of	the	
age.		Policy	entrepreneurialism	emerged	amongst	mandarins	who	were	not	scared	to	
butt	heads	with	politicians	or	with	colleagues,	and	were	quite	willing	to	make	their	case	
publicly	through	the	press	or	in	front	of	parliamentary	committees	when	necessary.	
	
In	essence,	the	changes	that	are	emerging	in	the	behaviour	and	leadership	roles	
of	contemporary	public	service	leaders	reflect	the	same	challenges,	albeit	translated	
into	a	twenty-first	century	context.		The	certainties	of	bureaucratic	governance	in	the	
social	welfare	state	of	the	post-World-War-Two	era	have	given	way	to	a	bewilderingly	
different	governance	environment.		As	in	Victorian	times,	governance	is	once	more	a	
matter	of	negotiating	through	networks	rather	than	command	and	control.		Rapid	
technological	change	once	again	challenges	entrenched	ways	of	governing,	this	time	
through	the	advances	of	the	digital	rather	than	the	industrial	age.		And	the	aggressively	
partisan	politics	of	today	mean	that	governments	require	new	public	actors	able	to	
make	the	case	for	longer-term	reforms	in	an	impartial	way.	
	
	
Whilst	some	of	the	current	governance	challenges	are	certainly	reminiscent	of	
the	Victorian	era,	there	are	some	unique	factors	that	make	pursuing	a	model	of	publicly	
transformative	leadership	more	difficult	today	than	it	was	for	Trevelyan.		Chief	amongst	
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these	is	the	24/7	news	cycle,	which	means	that	every	public	statement	and	action	of	
mandarins	is	broadcast	almost	in	real	time,	and	without	the	opportunity	for	reflection	
available	150	years	ago.		Equally,	the	conventions	of	what	a	Westminster	public	servant	
can	do	have	moved	on	considerably.		The	importance	of	neutral	non-partisanship	is	now	
enshrined	as	the	most	defining	feature	of	a	Westminster	bureaucracy.		When	a	
mandarin	speaks	publicly	today,	politicians	and	the	press	rush	to	frame	those	comments	
through	partisan	lenses,	pulling	public	servants	into	political	debates	in	which	the	policy	
can	get	lost	amidst	partisan	rancour	(Grube,	2014).	
	
Charles	Trevelyan	was	first	and	foremost	an	advocate,	within	and	outside	
government,	for	policy	ideas	and	administrative	innovation.		He	was	not	a	careful	
weigher	of	evidence	that	was	then	quietly	whispered	to	ministers	to	see	what	they	
wished	to	do	with	it.		He	had	clear	ideas,	backed	them	fiercely	with	persuasive	rhetoric,	
and	did	so	publicly	if	he	thought	it	necessary.		Nowhere	is	this	better	illustrated	than	in	
the	Northcote-Trevelyan	report	itself.		It	was	a	document	full	of	rhetorical	advocacy	–	of	
making	a	case	about	what	was	wrong	with	the	Civil	Service,	based	on	assertion	as	much	
as	it	was	based	on	evidence.		To	quote	one	historian,	‘…it	was	ostensibly	based	on	
months	of	detailed	inquiry	into	government	departments,	but	it	remains	transparently	a	
remarkable	piece	of	propaganda,	a	brilliant	manifesto	for	views	by	no	means	wholly	
based	on	an	objective	appraisal	of	facts’	(Roseveare,	1969,	pp.	168-9).		Other	historians	
have	tempered	that	analysis	by	emphasising	that	the	boldness	of	the	language	was	
backed	up	by	more	research	than	was	included	in	the	pages	of	the	report	itself.		
Multiple	inquiries	into	various	government	departments	had	in	fact	occurred	over	the	
decade	before	1854	to	provide	the	wider	evidential	foundation	on	which	the	Northcote-
Trevelyan	report	was	built	(see	Wright	1969,	pp.	xiii-xxxv;	Theakston	1999,	pp.	22-29).	
	
Trevelyan	was	a	policy	entrepreneur	rather	than	a	bureaucratic	cog	in	an	
administrative	machine.		He	was	an	innovator,	a	transformer	who	was	willing	to	take	
risks,	although	not	nearly	as	keen	to	take	responsibility	if	those	risks	failed.		Hennessy	
has	asserted	of	20th	century	mandarins	that	they	were	‘scarcely	household	names	in	
their	own	household.’i		Trevelyan	saw	no	such	need	to	hide	his	light	under	a	bushel	–	
and	indeed	rather	favoured	a	neon-sign	approach	to	public	leadership.		In	an	age	of	
rapid	reform,	Trevelyan	was	exactly	the	kind	of	reformer	that	politicians	perceive	
themselves	as	wanting	today.		He	was	energetic,	fearless,	unconcerned	with	trampling	
on	civil	service	tradition	or	upsetting	those	civil	servants	who	did	not	see	the	need	for	
reform.		Trevelyan	would	have	been	quite	at	home	in	serving	prime	ministers	like	
Thatcher	and	Blair	to	deliver	civil	service	change.	
	 	
	
Like	today’s	leaders,	Trevelyan	was	faced	with	a	differentiated	polity	of	
competing	elites	and	non-government	organisations	who	relied	upon	each	other	to	
effectively	implement	government	policy	in	the	absence	of	command	and	control	
options.			The	nineteenth-century	British	Civil	Service	was	not	a	purring	bureaucratic	
machine	with	controllers	in	bowler	hats	who	simply	had	to	pull	levers	to	make	things	
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run.		This	was	a	time	of	cobbled	together	reform	coalitions	trying	desperately	to	cope	
with	the	leaps	in	governing	complexity	brought	about	by	the	technological	
advancements	of	the	age,	the	demands	of	industry,	and	rampant	population	growth	–	
with	a	civil	service	designed	more	for	policy	advice	and	routine	copying	of	documents	
than	for	dynamic	responses	to	social	change.	
	
Trevelyan	and	his	contemporaries	operated	in	an	era	that	can	best	be	described	
as	a	state	of	flux,	even	allowing	for	the	fact	that	the	Westminster	system	has	always	
been	the	subject	of	evolutionary	change.		Conventions	of	ministerial	responsibility	and	
civil	service	impartiality	and	anonymity	had	not	yet	emerged	in	the	form	we	know	them	
today.		Historian	G.	Kitson	Clark	has	characterised	the	period	1830-1880	as	one	of	
transition.		‘…[I]n	that	period	there	are	some	of	the	most	formidable	divergencies	in	the	
behaviour	of	eminent	officials	from	anything	that	could	be	called	neutral	or	
anonymous…It	is	certainly	significant	that	one	of	the	most	notable	offenders	was	Sir	
Charles	Trevelyan	himself’	(Kitson	Clark,	1959,	p.	30).	
	
Today’s	mandarins	face	pressures	to	become	more	public	from	at	least	two	
quarters.		The	transparency	and	accountability	requirements	of	modern	government	
have	seen	public	service	leaders	held	more	rigorously	and	more	publicly	to	account	
through	forums	like	parliamentary	committee	hearings.		These	appearances	in	turn	have	
received	coverage	through	the	voracious	appetite	of	the	24/7	news	media,	boosting	the	
profile	of	the	public	servants	involved.		Secondly,	the	complexities	of	network	
governance	have	seen	senior	public	servants	engage	with	a	wider	range	of	groups	in	a	
wider	range	of	forums	than	was	traditionally	the	case.		Speeches	at	these	engagement	
events	are	-	through	the	advances	of	social	media	–	made	publicly	available	for	critics	
and	commentators	to	reflect	upon.		And	at	a	time	when	scrutiny	has	never	been	
greater,	politicians	in	advanced	democracies	across	the	world	are	exhorting	their	public	
servants	to	be	less	risk	averse	and	more	willing	to	embrace	new	ideas.	
	
Trevelyan’s	career	is	a	reminder	that	innovative	risk-takers	in	the	public	service	
are	magnets	for	controversy.		The	future	of	innovative	public	leadership	by	civil	service	
mandarins	may	well	rely	on	the	willingness	of	politicians	to	actually	embrace	the	reality	
of	the	kind	of	leadership	they	claim	to	want	from	public	service	leaders.		If	public	
statements	by	mandarins	in	policy	debates	are	immediately	met	by	finger	pointing	and	
accusations	of	partisanship	by	other	MPs,	it	can	only	serve	to	make	public	servants	even	
more	risk	averse.		And	yet	their	willingness	to	engage	in	public	debates	is	central	to	
successfully	fulfilling	their	role	in	a	modern	governance	environment	where	they	have	to	
reach	out	to	multiple	stakeholders	simultaneously,	whilst	articulating	a	transformative	
leadership	vision	for	their	departments	and	the	public	service	as	a	whole.	
	
For	example,	former	UK	Cabinet	Secretary	Sir	Gus	O’Donnell,	former	Australian	
Treasury	Secretary	Ken	Henry,	and	former	New	Zealand	Treasury	Secretary	John	
Whitehead	all	gave	multiple	speeches	while	in	office	on	challenges	like	climate	change,	
demographic	change,	and	fiscal	policy	reform	(Grube,	2012).		Similarly,	senior	public	
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servants	can	find	themselves	questioned	fiercely	by	parliamentary	select	committees	
charged	with	overseeing	their	work	in	ways	that	lead	to	a	stronger	public	profile.		For	
example,	the	British	Cabinet	Secretary	Sir	Jeremy	Heywood	was	publicly	chided	by	the	
Public	Administration	Committee	for	the	perceived	lack	of	depth	in	his	investigation	into	
allegations	that	the	Government	Chief	Whip	Andrew	Mitchell	had	called	police	officers	
guarding	the	Downing	Street	gates	‘plebs’	(Ross,	2013;	PAC,	2013).		Whilst	not	directly	
accusing	Heywood	of	having	become	politicised,	the	committee	did	criticise	his	decision	
to	agree	to	undertake	the	review	when	they	considered	it	to	be	outside	the	legitimate	
scope	of	his	work	as	Cabinet	Secretary.	
	
Those	senior	public	servants	who	engage	in	‘Trevelyanite’	behaviour	in	publicly	
contributing	on	policy	questions	can	–	like	Trevelyan	–	find	themselves	fiercely	criticised,	
and	yet	continue	to	be	seen	as	very	effective	public	administrators.		For	example,	while	
in	office,	former	British	Cabinet	Secretary	Gus	O’Donnell	agreed	to	co-edit	a	book	with	
Ed	Balls,	then	a	political	adviser	to	the	British	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	Gordon	
Brown	(Balls,	O’Donnell	and	Grice,	2004).		The	book,	published	by	the	Treasury,	
explained	the	microeconomic	reforms	being	pursued	by	the	Blair	government.		Critics	
like	Aucoin	characterise	the	book	as	an	example	of	the	‘promiscuous	partisanship’	he	
was	warning	against	(Aucoin,	2012,	189).		Despite	such	criticism,	O’Donnell	went	on	to	
serve	both	Labour	and	Conservative	governments	and	retired	at	the	end	of	2011	as	a	
civil	servant	who	continued	to	command	the	confidence	of	all	sides	of	politics.		This	
suggests	that	a	‘Trevelyanite’	willingness	to	substantively	contribute	to	public	discussion	
need	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	loss	of	trust	in	impartial	public	administrators.	
	
Similarly,	following	the	death	of	Margaret	Thatcher	in	2013,	the	Cabinet	
Secretary	Jeremy	Heywood	and	the	Head	of	the	Civil	Service	Bob	Kerslake	co-authored	a	
newspaper	article	in	the	London	Telegraph,	reflecting	on	what	it	had	been	like	as	a	
public	servant	to	work	for	Prime	Minister	Thatcher.		Whilst	not	containing	any	overt	
support	for	particular	Thatcherite	policies,	the	article	was	heavily	criticised	by	MPs	from	
the	opposition	Labour	Party	for	its	general	lack	of	acknowledgement	of	any	criticism	of	
Thatcher	and	her	policies.		The	two	Civil	Servants	were	accused	by	one	MP	of	having	
‘prostituted	your	high	office	and	deserted	your	political	neutrality’	(Syal,	2013).		Whilst	
thus	becoming	a	matter	of	temporary	political	debate,	there	is	little	evidence	that	the	
episode	has	caused	long-term	damage	to	the	ability	of	both	men	to	command	bi-
partisan	respect.			At	the	time	of	writing,	both	retain	their	permanent	secretary	
appointments,	although	Kerslake	has	relinquished	the	role	of	Head	of	the	Civil	Service.	
	
Ultimately,	the	test	of	whether	the	Westminster	system	can	allow	a	Trevelyanite	
level	of	public	interaction	without	being	seen	as	becoming	politicised	rests	not	just	on	
where	mandarins	perceive	lines	to	be,	but	on	the	willingness	of	politicians	to	extend	a	
license	to	comment.		Once	MPs	become	intolerant	of	mandarins	daring	to	venture	a	
public	view	on	aspects	of	policy	and	act	to	remove	them	because	of	it,	the	degree	of	
licence	Trevelyan	was	able	to	rely	upon	breaks	down.		For	example,	the	incoming	Abbott	
government	in	Australia	in	2013	sacked	three	departmental	heads	and	a	fourth	–	Martin	
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Parkinson	–	agreed	to	move	on	within	the	year.		At	least	in	part,	this	was	seen	in	the	
media	as	a	response	to	the	extent	to	which	some	of	the	senior	public	servants	had	
become	publicly	associated	with	the	policy	positions	of	the	previous	government	(e.g.	
Towell,	2013;	Mannheim,	2013).		
	
So	Trevelyan	provides	a	prototype	of	sorts	–	but	his	is	certainly	not	an	approach	
well-tailored	to	the	risk	averse.		His	career	demonstrates	how	one	could	be	noisy,	risky,	
even	controversial,	and	still	be	a	widely	respected	Westminster	public	servant.		That	is	
no	mean	feat,	although	if	anything	the	task	has	become	even	more	difficult	for	
contemporary	mandarins	who	may	wish	to	adopt	a	similar	approach.		It	is	arguable	that	
the	twenty-first	century	governance	environment,	with	its	focus	on	transparency,	
accountability,	and	delivery	–	all	under	the	watchful	eye	of	a	24/7	media	–	is	not	likely	to	
be	as	forgiving	of	public	service	leaders	who	pursue	goals	with	a	single-minded	
indifference	to	the	views	of	critics.	The	experiences	of	Sir	Nicholas	Macpherson	and	
Martin	Parkinson	alluded	to	earlier	demonstrate	that	allegations	of	partisanship	are	
easier	to	make	than	they	are	to	refute.	But	in	embracing	opportunities	for	‘public’	
leadership,	today’s	senior	public	servants	are	demonstrating	the	kind	of	skills	necessary	
to	operate	in	a	governance	environment	in	which	public	persuasion	is	a	growing	part	of	
their	role.	In	doing	so,	modern	leaders	are	connecting	with	an	older,	more	publicly	
engaged	and	publicly	combative	tradition	of	civil	service	leadership,	as	exemplified	by	
Trevelyan.	
	
Today’s	mandarins	operate	in	a	time	of	great	governance	complexity.		They	have	
to	engage	with	a	differentiated	and	often	disjointed	polity,	relying	on	networks	of	actors	
in	order	to	deliver	the	outcomes	sought	by	governments.		They	do	this	whilst	under	the	
scrutiny	of	a	powerful	and	often	abrasive	media	and	in	the	teeth	of	intense	partisan	
debates	at	a	political	level.		Public	service	leaders	are	responding	by	displaying	the	skills	
demanded	by	the	exigencies	of	the	time.		They	are	prepared	to	publicly	lead	through	
speeches	and	engagement	with	the	media	in	order	to	stimulate	and	progress	debates	
on	major	issues.		In	some	cases	they	are	willing	to	do	so	even	if	it	means	coming	into	
conflict	with	politicians.		The	career	of	Charles	Trevelyan	shows	that	it’s	been	done	
before,	and	that	it’s	possible	to	do	it	without	destroying	the	fundamentals	of	the	
Westminster	system	of	government.	
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